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As announced in the budget for the European Union that was 
accepted on 8 February 2013 by the European Council, and 
today still featuring on the wish list (European Commission, 
2016), the Union wants to introduce new own resources to 
finance the Union’s budget. The proposed European taxes are a 
Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) and an EU Value Added Tax 
(VAT). With the latter, the consumer would see on every sales 
slip that part of the VAT that he or she pays goes directly to 
Brussels. The FTT is now approved by 10 of the 28 Member 
States; the VAT is still the subject of debate (European Council, 
2012). Since it is still open for discussion, this paper looks at 
the latter new own resource: it highlights the potential and 
limitations of reforming the financing of the EU budget by 
means of an EU VAT based on the actual VAT collected in the 
Member States (MS). The question is asked why the existing 
VAT based contribution of the MS is unsatisfactory and why a 
direct contribution of the citizens to the Union would be an 
improvement. The paper also adds to the present discussion 
with regard to the introduction of an EU VAT.  After looking at 
the pros and cons of an EU VAT, a qualitative assessment 
reveals that the regressivity of the VAT (consumption, and 
hence the VAT, tends to constitute a higher proportion of the 
GNP of the poorer MS), the different levels of tax fraud 
amongst the MS, and the EU decision-making process itself 
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seem to be the most fundamental obstacles to the introduction of 
this type of tax. The paper concludes by outlining a so-called 
declaratory EU VAT as an alternative to the European 
Commission’s present proposal. With a declaratory tax, a 
country still pays its national, GNI based contribution, but it 
shows the contribution to its citizens as a percentage of the total 
VAT on every receipt.  
 
Keywords: European Union, EU budget, own resources, EU 
VAT. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Within the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for the 
European Union (EU or Union) for the present seven year period, 
2014-2020, the European Commission (Commission), the Union’s 
executive arm, wants to introduce two new own resources to 
finance the general EU budget (European Commission, 2011a, 
2016a; HLG 2014). The budget for this period is about 960 billion 
euro or one percent of the GNI of the EU Member States. The 
proposed budget for 2017 is about 156 billion euro. The two 
proposed European taxes are a Financial Transaction Tax and an 
EU Value Added Tax. The Value Added Tax (VAT) is a general, 
broadly based consumption tax assessed on the value added to 
goods and services. It applies more or less to all goods and services 
that are bought and sold for use or consumption. The first tax, the 
FTT, involves a tax rate of 0.1% on trades in shares, bonds and 
other securities and 0.01% on derivatives transactions. The FTT 
now has been approved by 11 of the 27 Member States.
1
 With the 
second tax proposed, the consumer can see on every sales slip that 
part of the VAT paid goes directly to Brussels. This latter tax is still 
a work in progress and the subject of debate (European Council, 
2013), which explains the topic and relevance of this paper.  
In this paper we look at the policy and decision-making process 
with regard to the introduction of an EU VAT as a new own 
resource. The central questions of the paper are: Why is the existing 
VAT based contribution of the Member States to finance the EU 
                                                 
1
 For a qualitative assessment of the FTT, see Leen 2012 and 2013.  
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budget unsatisfactory? and Why is a direct contribution of the 
citizens to the Union, an EU VAT, an improvement?  
Following the introduction the paper discusses the role of the 
existing VAT based contribution, in the past and present, as an own 
resource for the Union. Next, the Commission’s proposal for a new 
VAT based contribution is introduced. In the fourth part, we list the 
proposal’s pros and cons. We use the penultimate section to answer 
our two main questions: (1) Is the new VAT better than the old 
one? and (2) Is the proposal viable in view of the Union’s decision-
making process? The paper concludes by discussing the option of a 
declaratory VAT in the last section. A declaratory EU VAT 
combines the strong points of the present GNI based own resource 
with an EU VAT based resource. 
 
 
The History of an EU VAT 
 
During its initial period, from 1957 onwards, the Union was 
financed through direct contributions by the Member States.
2
 
However, Article 201 of the Treaty of Rome (Treaty), signed in 
1957, stipulated already that a system of own resources, or self-
financing, was to be introduced at the end of a transition period. In 
1970 the EU made the milestone decision to replace national 
contributions by the Communities’ own resources. At present 75% 
of the EU budget is financed once more by direct contributions, 
though, which also runs counter to the philosophy behind the 
Treaty. One of the new resources, introduced in the 1970s, in 
addition to levies on agricultural and sugar trade with the rest of the 
world and custom duties on trade with third countries, were 
resources accruing from a proportion of the national VAT revenues. 
They derive from the application of a call rate to the Member 
States’ VAT bases set according to harmonized rules. Originally, 
the tax was to be no more than 1 percent (European Communities, 
1970). 
Although all three resources are called own resources, the first 
two resources mentioned are regarded as real or true own resources. 
                                                 
2
 For an extensive history of the development of the Union’s financial system, see 
European Commission (2014). 
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They are called traditional own resources. They arise from 
Community policy instruments: the Common Agricultural Policy 
and the common commercial tariff. In general, these resources are 
not seen as a national contribution towards the Community budget. 
Also from the beginning there was a distinct difference, albeit not in 
Community law, in the political perception at the national level 
between traditional own resources and the VAT based contribution. 
The VAT is generally perceived by governments and national 
parliaments as a mere budgetary contribution (European Commission, 
1998). The first two resources are, as just mentioned, linked to EU 
policies whereas the VAT based resource and the fourth resource, a 
GNI based own resource introduced in 1988, are based on statistical 
aggregates. 
In 1970, the levies on agricultural and sugar trade were 
transferred immediately to the EU. The same was done progressively 
between 1970 and 1975 with the customs duties on trade. It took, 
however, until 1979 to reach agreement on a harmonized VAT 
base.  
Since successive trade negotiations reduced world tariffs, the 
traditional own resources as a proportion of total resources 
declined. The share of traditional own resources went from almost 
50 percent of the budget in 1979 to just 20 percent in 1993, whereas 
it currently is about 15 percent. During its heyday in 1990 the VAT 
furnished 70 percent of the EU budget, by 2005 this had dropped to 
16 percent and now it is good for about 10 percent of the total EU 
budget (Lehner 2015).  
Until the introduction of the fourth resource in 1988, the GNI 
based own resource, the VAT resource was the predominant 
resource. Due to growing expenses at the end of the seventies, the 
Commission identified a serious revenue problem. In addition to 
some other taxes, e.g., part of the taxes on cigarettes and part of the 
taxes on petrol, a simple increase in the VAT rate was suggested as 
a solution. This resulted in the decision to increase the VAT rate to 
1.4 percent at the Fontainebleau Conference in 1984. Later, the 
maximum VAT rate was maintained at 1.4 percent but capped at 55 
percent of the GNP for all Member States. During the first term of 
Jacques Delors as President of the Commission, from 1988-1992, a 
revenue limit was agreed upon for the whole EU budget for the first 
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time: a ceiling of 1.2 percent of the EU GNP.
3
 In 1996 the 
maximum VAT rate was reduced to 1 percent and capped at 50 
percent of the GNP for the cohesion states, which at that time were 
Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland (Laffan, 1997). In the MFF, the 
VAT call rate for the period 2007-13 was 0.3%. A reduced rate of 
0.225% for Austria, 0.15% for Germany and 0.10% for the 
Netherlands and Sweden applied, and VAT bases were capped for 
all Member States at 50% of the GNI. In 2011 this resulted for, e.g., 
Greece in a payment of 278 million euro, for France in about 3 
billion euro, and for the Netherlands in 290 million euro. Under the 
present MFF a reduced VAT call rate of 0.15% (rather than 0.30%) 
applies to Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden.  
The reason to no longer rely on a higher VAT rate was an 
attempt to deal with the regressive nature of the VAT resource: 
consumption, and hence the VAT, tends to form a greater 
proportion of the GNP of the Community’s poorer members. 
Moreover, Member States with a higher share of tourism also show 
a higher consumption rate, the so-called Marbella effect. VAT 
contributions, as an indication of wealth, also inevitably overstate 
the ability of the poorer MS to pay. Capping the proportion of the 
VAT for calculations on the uniform base represented a search for 
more equitable burden-sharing in the budget and hence more social 
justice. In general it was agreed by the European Council (1987), 
consisting of the heads of state or government and the President of 
the European Commission, that the financial system should take 
greater account of the proportionality of contributions with the 
relative prosperity of MS. The Commission concluded that less 
prosperous states, the cohesion states mentioned above, all had 
relatively high VAT bases and thus were disadvantaged under the 
1988 system, even with capping. This was true especially since, 
because of the economic growth at that time, the newly introduced 
fourth resource, a topping up of the budget based on the GNI of the 
MS, was not very effective.  
In sum, the problem remained how to tackle the regressive 
nature and hence perceived social injustice of the existing VAT 
contribution. As previously stated, the system was advantageous to 
                                                 
3
 The GNI based resource (the ‘residual’ resource) is determined so that total revenue 
balances total expenditure. 
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MS with a low VAT base and penalized those, generally poorer, 
states with a high VAT base. In general the Commission (1998) and 
the MS declared their willingness to take greater account of the 
contributive capacity of individual MS in the system of own 
resources (European Commission, 1998).  
 
The United Kingdom VAT Rebate and Brexit 
  
However, the VAT rate also played another role with respect to 
the ability to pay: the UK problem. Already before the accession it 
was known that the UK would pay a disproportionate amount into 
the Community budget. The reason for this was its trade structure 
and the high level of imports from non-Community states in 
particular. On the expenditure side the UK was, at least that was 
how it was perceived by the MS at the time, unlikely to benefit 
greatly from the Common Agricultural Policy. Also, just like the 
cohesion countries, the UK paid a disproportionate contribution 
based on relative wealth to the budget. It was agreed that an 
equitable solution was needed. The resulting structural UK 
budgetary rebate, after some earlier ad hoc solutions, materialised 
in the form of a reduction of the VAT contribution. The refund to 
the UK is 66 percent of the difference between the receipts from the 
Union and the VAT contribution (European Council, 2007). Here 
too we see the special position of the traditional own resources, 
though, which should not be calculated as part of a net contribution. 
Mutatis mutandis, other Member States saw their juste-retour 
problems repaired by a correction of their VAT contributions. 
Another important reason for the Union to introduce an EU tax 
is to counter the above-mentioned juste-retour behaviour of the 
Member States, as was brought to the fore in the discussion about 
the UK VAT contribution. States favour expenditures that improve 
their net national benefits and contributions to the Union rather than 
those with the greatest added value for the EU as a whole. Such 
purely self-interested behaviour has been shown to be the result of 
the dominant way of financing the EU – with national, GNI based 
contributions. This method of financing “places disproportionate 
emphasis on net balances between Member States [,] thus 
contradicting the principle of EU solidarity, diluting the European 
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common interest and largely ignoring European added value” 
(European Commission, 2011c).
4
  
The recent Brexit, the UK’s decision to leave the EU after a 
referendum was held on 23 June 2016, can, however, be an 
opportunity to break with the past with its emphasis on juste retour. 
The reason for this is that the UK VAT rebate is the only rebate that 
was meant to be “forever” and all other rebates have to be re-
established time and again (European Commission, 2014). It could 
also mean a switch in the discussions, from an emphasis on net 
contributions towards a budget that reinforces real EU added value 
(Ferrer et.al., 2016). 
In sum, the problem of regressiveness and the way that it is 
solved, by capping the VAT base, has made the distributional 
effects of the VAT resource similar to that of the GNI resource 
(Heinemann, 2008). There are major disadvantages, however, 
compared to a purely GNI based resource. First, the present VAT 
own resource creates high administrative costs as a harmonized 
base must be calculated for this purpose (European Commission, 
2008). Second, because of all of the exceptions granted to 
individual Member States, it is unnecessarily complex and difficult 
to understand for the citizens. The VAT contribution has become a 
contribution based on GNP. As the Court of Auditors has stated, 
“the VAT resource is levied on a ‘virtual’ basis (harmonized VAT 
base which may be subsequently capped and takes into account 
compensation arrangements for UK) which is complex to the point 
of incomprehensibility” (European Commission 2011b).5 All in all, 
the result is that it is the Commission’s priority to abolish the 
existing VAT own resource.  
  
 
An EU VAT  
 
Thus, the existing VAT resource based on a share of national 
VAT receipts, is complex, requires a lot of administrative work to 
                                                 
4
 For reasons why the net balance approach is (even more) illogical today and in 
conflict with the solidarity principle, see Ferrer et al. (2016). 
5
 For the incomprehensible correction of budgetary imbalances, see Art.1 European 
Commission, 2004/017 (CNS), Brussels 3.8.2004, p. 25. Cp. European Commission 
(2008), p. 234-244. 
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arrive at a harmonized base, and offers little or no added value 
compared to the GNI based own resource (European Commission, 
2011b). In search of new own resources the introduction of a new 
EU VAT is an option favoured by the Commission and the 
European Parliament. The Commission’s objective is to make the 
VAT based contribution as simple and transparent as possible, to 
strengthen the link with EU VAT policy and the actual VAT 
receipts, and to ensure equal treatment of taxpayers in all Member 
States. So what does the new VAT look like?  
The Commission proposes to apply a single EU VAT rate. 
National authorities would still raise the money and then transfer it 
to the EU budget. The option of a new VAT resource alongside 
Member States’ VAT poses serious technical implementation 
problems and has therefore been discarded (European Commission, 
2011b). A genuine EU wide tax base would replace the complex 
formula currently required to generate a theoretical EU VAT tax 
base. The Commission estimates that a 1% EU rate applied to the 
standard rate of VAT in every Member State would result in 
revenues of between 20.9 and 50.4 billion euro. The exact amount 
would depend on how narrow or wide the chosen tax base would be 
(European Commission, 2011b). At the moment, however, the main 
stumbling block for the realization of an EU VAT is the incomplete 
harmonization of Member States’ VAT systems. Hence, the policy 
could be part of the wider EU policy on overhauling the existing 
VAT legislation. The aim of that policy is to come to a greater 
standardization of rates and fewer reduced rates across EU Member 
States in order to increase the strength of the internal market 
(European Commission, 2010). 
In sum, the introduction of an EU VAT means that the 
combined VAT rate in the Member States consists of a national rate 
and an EU rate. Member States still determine their own national 
rate and the EU rate is defined separately within the framework of 
the own resource decision. In addition to the national VAT 
payment, the EU VAT payments are clearly indicated on each 
individual invoice. The Member States collect the EU VAT and 
then transfer the proceeds to the EU budget; it is a revenue transfer 
mechanism and not a parallel system to that of the MS. The tax base 
corresponds to the smallest common denominator of the national 
VAT systems. This means that a good that is subject to the national 
VAT at the standard rate in a Member State is subject to the new 
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VAT resource rate unless the same good is subject to a reduced rate 
or an exemption in another Member State (European Commission, 
2011b).  
It must be noted, however, that the overall contribution of the 
MS stays the same at about 1% of their GNI. It is only the 
composition of the contribution to the Union’s budget that changes. 
Some countries will pay a greater percentage of their total 
contribution through their VAT contribution and others will pay 
more by way of the other own resources, i.e. the levies on 
agricultural and sugar trade, the customs duties and the GNI based 
contribution. 
  
 
The Pros and Cons of a New EU VAT  
 
The Pros 
 
On the positive side, there are some clear benefits. A first 
benefit of the Commission’s proposal is its visibility and simplicity 
for EU citizens. On every sale’s slip the consumer can see how 
much of the money paid goes to the Union and hence how much he 
or she pays to the Union’s budget. This could also fulfil the wish of 
the European Parliament and Commission to create a better bond 
between the EU citizens/corporations and the Union. The reason for 
this is that the Union has evolved from a bond between Member 
States to a bond between MS and its citizens. If, as is proposed, the 
total tax burden for the citizens of the Union will indeed stay the 
same after the introduction of the EU VAT, it can easily be 
introduced for the goods concerned. All that needs to be done is 
deducting the EU rate of 1% from the current national VAT rate.  
Second, it is said that with a new true own resource the Union’s 
financial autonomy would grow. Juste-retour behaviour of the MS 
would be less pronounced and hence the EU economic resources 
would be allocated more efficiently. At the same time, because of 
its higher visibility for EU citizens, we could see an increased 
political accountability for expenditure decisions.  
Third, and related to the previous point, it brings the size of the 
EU budget into perspective for the citizens. At present the budget is 
about 130 billion euro. A 1% sales tax, as the Commission expects, 
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could furnish about a third of the EU budget. The contribution of, 
e.g., Greece would be 1.1 billion euro, whereas France would 
contribute 8.2 billion euro and the Netherlands 2.2 billion euro.  
In addition to the fact that the VAT is a stable source of 
revenue, a fourth benefit of the EU VAT is that tax receipts grow in 
line with increased spending without any change in the VAT rate. 
In this respect the benefits of the EU VAT resemble the strong 
points of the present GNI contribution.  
Fifth, the development of a common VAT system has been a 
cornerstone of the Internal Market. The existing complexity is 
considered harmful to the single market and to the competitiveness 
of EU business. The introduction of a new own resource could be 
underpinned by this trend of broadening the tax base, reducing the 
scope for fraud, improving the administration of the tax and 
reducing compliance costs. At present, in particular for cross-border 
supplies, the VAT system remains complicated and burdensome. 
According to the Commission (2011b), a fraction of the gains 
derived from this reform could be attributed to the EU level. 
Sixth, the system would closely link national policies for VAT 
with EU budget policies. This would mean a shift towards indirect 
rather than direct taxation.     
Seventh, if individual citizens pay directly to the Union the 
often cited Marbella effect would no longer be relevant. As said, 
this effect places a relatively high burden on the Mediterranean 
countries with their higher share of tourism. The old VAT system 
that is to be abolished, involved national contributions. In the new 
VAT system, however, it are the individuals - tourists or locals - 
who pay. 
 
The Cons 
 
On the negative side, some serious problems exist. First, 
probably only lip service will be paid to earlier statements that the 
tax burden for citizens will stay the same with the introduction of an 
EU tax (European Parliament, 2007). Most likely, the total tax rate 
for consumers will rise. Because of its high visibility it could also 
be a problem that citizens would perceive the EU VAT to be an 
additional burden rather than replacing a national contribution. 
After all, at least half of all revolutions in the world are said to be 
tax revolutions (Nef, 2002: 42). The Union’s aim is to create a 
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direct bond with EU citizens, but this could have the opposite 
effect. The Commission does not mention public support for an EU 
VAT, but it does mention that 65% of European citizens support the 
FTT. The latter tax is designed to discourage what it considers 
socially useless trading activities and let the banks pay for the crisis. 
And although consumers can be fooled into thinking that someone 
else pays the bill with the FTT (Worstall, 2011), this will not be the 
case with an EU VAT. If the total VAT cannot be raised, the 
measure will probably not be attractive for national governments 
compared to the FTT. An FTT does not only leave the present tax 
receipt for Member States at the same level but it even adds revenue 
to the Member States. 
Second, a genuine EU wide VAT tax base would remove the 
possibility of MS tailoring VAT rates to changing economic 
circumstances and redress the regressive nature, the perceived 
social injustice, of the tax (Open Europe, 2011). Throughout 
history, the regressive nature has always been taken seriously and 
can even be seen as the reason for the fact that the present EU VAT 
contribution is no more than a GNI based contribution.
6
 In the past, 
the European Parliament (1994) already wanted to impose different 
tax rates on different categories of goods to mitigate the regressive 
effect of the tax. For the same reason the European Commission, 
(2011b) also looked at the option of a modulated VAT that would 
allow for different EU VAT rates to be applied to different 
categories of goods. 
Third, as far as the actual introduction of an EU VAT is 
concerned, since the Member States recently increased their 
existing VAT rates the room to increase them any further in the 
near future is small. Therefore, an EU VAT will not solve the 
problem that the EU heavily rests on GNI based resources.  
Fourth, as for any change in the own resource system there will 
be distributive consequences. Based on calculations made by 
Heinemann (2008), the introduction of an EU VAT would have 
major distributive consequences. Cyprus, e.g., would have to pay 
almost 70% more than in the case of GNI proportionality, as with 
                                                 
6
 Recently, however, the Commission (2011b, p. 107) did find a slightly negative---but 
not statistically significant---relationship between the potential revenues from the 
hypothetical new VAT resource and the GNI per capita of the Member States.  
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the present VAT contribution. Denmark, on the other hand, would 
have to pay almost 20% less. Again, the reason is the regressive 
character of the VAT that puts a relatively greater burden on the 
poorer Southern and Eastern Member States due to a higher 
consumption ratio. In short, in the decision-making process the old 
juste-retour hurdle has to be taken once more.  
Fifth, the regressive character of VAT contributions is not 
tackled. As far as the regressive character goes the switch from a 
burden in terms of national GNI to per capita consumption is non-
essential. 
Sixth, the decision-making process for a Treaty change to the 
own resource system is one of the most difficult for the Union. The 
proposal of the European Commission, after having consulted the 
European Parliament, must be adopted unanimously by the Council 
and the national parliaments of the 27 MS. At the moment, for the 
European Parliament a reform of the own resources towards 
genuine own resources is a non-negotiable point for giving its 
consent to the MFF. The outcome of this process is still undecided 
at present.  
Seventh, because of national differences regarding tax fraud and 
administrative efficiency the postulate of horizontal equity is 
violated. In the 1990s, the rate of VAT evasion and fraud ranged 
from 2.4 percent in the Netherlands to 34.5 percent in Italy 
(Heinemann, 2008). 
 
   
A Qualitative Assessment of an EU VAT  
 
Given and affirming the pros, what cons do stand out as 
outweighing the pros? Three problems seem to stand out most 
significantly in view of the introduction of a reformed EU VAT: the 
regressivity of the VAT, tax fraud, and the decision-making 
process. If indeed the total national VAT rate stays the same, 
regressivity cannot be a problem. There is a situation of status quo: 
nothing changes for the consumer. As indicated the overall 
contribution stays the same for the MS as well, only its composition 
changes. Probably, however, notwithstanding the intentions of the 
Commission and European Parliament, the total VAT rate will 
increase and regressivity and hence social justice will play a major 
role. The problem of tax fraud will not be that easy to overcome, 
The Pros and Cons of Value Added Tax as a New Own Resource to Finance 
the Budget of the European Union: A Qualitative Assessment  
 
15 
notwithstanding the Union’s policy to achieve a better overall VAT. 
The policy will probably mostly reduce cross-border VAT fraud. In 
the short run, the official process of decision-making looks to be the 
most compelling obstacle. Since national contributions do change, 
the juste-retour behaviour of the MS will be pervasive. 
Is there a compelling reason for introducing a new EU VAT? 
We ask this question because the present GNI based own resource 
has some strong points and receives support from the MS. Besides 
that, juste-retour behaviour is natural and hard to fight.
7
 National 
payments of the GNI resource are easy to calculate, understood by 
the citizens, and are seen as a good indicator for a nation’s 
capability to pay. In short, the system is seen as a simple and fair 
way of financing. However, because of tax fraud, some countries 
will underestimate their GNI. In sum, the GNI contribution is not 
much different from what the European Parliament wants to 
achieve with an EU VAT. That is, apart from the fact that no direct 
relation with the EU citizens would exist and that the financial 
autonomy of the European Union would not be changed.  
Probably, however, with the new EU VAT the MS will still 
show the juste-retour behaviour, ic. do have the net balance 
approach to the EU budget. Moreover, it is no goal of the Union to 
achieve autonomy. Or at least it shouldn’t be, even though financial 
autonomy is of course something that every bureaucracy wants 
(Alves & Afonso, 2008). Therefore, it can never be a goal per se. It 
can only be a goal because of some other goal that otherwise cannot 
be attained. For the Union this is clearly the goal of securing 
expenses with an added value for Europe as a whole. For the same 
reason and by contrast, however, an EU tax may lead to less 
budgetary discipline at the European level. 
The problem of autonomy is closely related to the fact that 
Member States interpret an EU tax as a loss of their fiscal 
sovereignty. Hence, the European Parliament (2007) emphasizes 
that “fiscal sovereignty will be maintained, but only temporary the 
receipts of certain taxes will go directly to the EU”. From an 
economic point of view, however, the eternal socialization of an 
asset’s return is the same as the socialization of the asset itself (Sinn 
                                                 
7
 See Leen (2011).  
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& Feist, 2000). Mutatis mutandis, this is also true for the temporary 
pooling of the revenue of taxation.  
In sum, is it not possible to come to a more definite qualitative 
or quantitative answer (e.g., European Parliament, 1997) by stating 
the criteria for judging an EU VAT and attributing quantitative 
weights to them? All of this has been done and tried by the Union 
(Federal Ministry of Finance, 2014; Schratzenstaller & Berghuber, 
2006). Both the Commission and the European Parliament have 
mentioned visibility, simplicity, financial autonomy, efficiency, 
sufficiency, cost-effectiveness, stability of revenue, equity, and 
added value for Europe as potential criteria (Begg, et.al. 2008). The 
problem is how to tackle this ‘shopping list’ of criteria that the 
VAT, or any other EU tax, would have to fulfil: what criteria need 
to be included in our measurement and what weights need to be 
attached to these criteria (Begg & Grimwade (1998); Cattoir 
(2004); European Parliament (1997))? Another problem with the 
proposed tax concerns the quality of the legislative process 
(European Commission 2016b; Radaelli, 2004). Furthermore, there 
is the matter of legality (Menéndez, 2003)8: did all parties 
participate in the process and can their respective expectations be 
met? The tax that is actually chosen will probably be an ad hoc 
political choice based, as is often the case, on odd compromises 
(Laffan 2000; Benedetto & Milio 2012). In order to facilitate a 
rational discussion that will fulfil the quality demands of both 
national and international law, the EU must hence first arrive at a 
manageable list of criteria (Heinemann, 2008; FiFo, 2016)
9
.     
 
   
An Alternative Way to Introduce an EU VAT: A Declaratory 
EU VAT 
 
Is there another way to introduce an EU VAT without the 
difficulties that we just mentioned? An EU VAT can also be 
introduced in the form of a so-called declaratory tax. With a 
declaratory tax a country still pays its national, GNI based 
contribution to the EU, but it shows its contribution to its citizens as 
                                                 
8
 According to Menéndez, legal, normative and prudential criteria require a partial 
transfer of the taxation right to the EU. 
9
 Heinemann bases his assessment criteria on the theories of fiscal federalism, public 
choice, European integration, and traditional principles of public finance. 
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a percentage of, e.g., the VAT on every receipt (Caesar, 2001). The 
amount is pro forma linked to a certain tax; a country can choose its 
own ‘EU tax’. Since the preferred method of taxation differs 
between Member States, this is an advantage. Harmonization of tax 
bases between countries is not necessary. Another advantage is that 
no additional collection costs have to be made. The quality of the 
national tax authorities does not matter either, as would be the case 
with a new true EU VAT because of tax fraud. At present, not every 
country collects the tax revenues that it should in view of the 
existing tax rate. With the new EU tax there would be no horizontal 
equity between the citizens of the Member States. Greece, where 
consumption amounts to two thirds of the GNI, collected about the 
same amount of VAT as the Netherlands, for example: about 8 
percent of the GNI. In the Netherlands, however, consumption 
amounts to less than half of the GNI (Gros, 2008).  
There are also some disadvantages, though. Because the VAT 
rates will differ between Member States, no horizontal equity will 
exist among the citizens of the Member States. The main argument 
against it, however, is that the public is misled in a sense. The 
Union still receives direct contributions from the Member States; 
the autonomy of the EU seems larger than it is.  
In sum, a declaratory EU VAT tax combines the strong points 
of the GNI contribution with the visibility of an EU VAT.  
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